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This manuscript uses a global and comprehensive approach based on 1.14 million 
observations to investigate whether the effect of corruption can be measured towards safety 
qualities of vessels. Since safety qualities of vessels are influenced by many factors and the 
effect of corruption can be confounded by their interactions, a multi-step approach in used at 
ship. The findings confirm the hypothesis that port states with higher perceived corruption are 
less likely to detain vessels and that flag states or ship owners located in countries associated 
with higher perceived corruption are more likely to have very serious incidents as the 
operating environment might facilitate substandard shipping and weaker enforcement of 
international conventions or increased operating costs that can influence safety qualities of 
vessels in economic hardship. The findings also revealed the degree of underreporting for 
serious incidents by flag states. The results support the establishment of accountability 
frameworks and current efforts at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to address 
corruption to support sustainable development goal 16 (SDG 16). Relevant policy 
implications could be to strengthen the fight against corruption via IMO’s Member State 
Audit Scheme and Facilitation Committee in general and specifically by strengthening 
training and enforcement of the Code of Good Conduct for Port State Control Inspectors. To 
enhance transparency, the Global Integrated Ship Information System could be adjusted to 
include an option to report corruption directly by ship owners and operators to IMO and flag 
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The topic of corruption in the maritime industry has been analysed from various aspects 
mainly using qualitative approaches. The topic is complex and multi-dimensional, and data is 
limited for empirical analysis at the global level. The Maritime Anti-Corruption Network 
(MACN), an industry led initiative to address corruption has received 38,000 anonymous 
reports of corruption of 1,365 ports since 2011 (MACN, 2019). In 2020, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) via its Facilitation Committee (FAL) (IMO, 2019a) provided 
possible ways forward to address corruption in cooperation with the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) including the possible development of a new module for the 
Global Integrated Ship Information System (GISIS). 
The multi-dimensional nature of corruption means that it can be found in different ways and 
with different levels of understanding of what constitutes corruption. Corruption hinders 
sustainable growth and is found to be correlated with long term economic growth and often 
affects least developed countries disproportionately (United Nations Global Compact and 
Transparency International 2011, Podobnik et al (2008), Shao et al (2007)). Furthermore, 
sustainable development goal 16 specifically relates to the fight against corruption (Hutter, 
2018). Sequeira and Djankov (2010) investigate corruption at the port state level. Graziano 
(2018) investigates port state control performance including corruption. Examples of 
corruption that are experienced by ship owners can come in the form of facilitation payments, 
a carton of cigarettes, a case of whiskey or cash payments to clear the vessel through port 
formalities, receive a deficiency free port state control (PSC) inspection or vetting report, or 
for provision of services, equipment or supplies that are not actually provided. If the ship 
refuses to pay, it will incur delays or penalties that cannot be insured against or mitigated 
through other mechanisms. The financial costs of these delays are then often many times the 
amount of the bribe or facilitation payments sought. 
For ship owners or operators, corruption is often part of political risk and factored into the 
business environment (Salleh et al, 2015, Lindroos, 2019) especially when operating or 
trading in ports of less developed nations. Sequeira and Djankov (2010) for instance 
demonstrate different ways of opportunities for corruption in South Africa that can emerge 
and distinguish between collusive and coercive types of corruption. They define collusive 
corruption as a means for shipping companies to reduce their costs while coercive corruption 
increases their cost of operating. They also conclude that shipping companies adapt to the 
challenges to work with the public system on hand and measure the effect on demand for 
services such as ports to be used.  
In addition, for a ship owner, the additional costs associated with corruption can impact upon 
the profitability of the vessel’s operation especially during periods of economic hardship. 
When this occurs the standard of safety on board declines which is reflected in increased 
accident risks. Ship management companies often factor the cost of corruption into their 
budgeting process as an additional operational expenditure and simply accept it as an 
inevitable cost of doing business in certain parts of the world. Often it is treated as operational 
expenditure in the same way as other operational costs in order to carry out their lawful 
business activities. Whilst global shipping continues to absorb these invisible costs, the 
impact on the bottom-line during times of industry or sector down turns can quickly turn a 
safe and sustainable operation into a loss-making venture. Rabarijaona (2017) studies the 
impact of anti-corruption initiatives in the maritime industry and tries to identify the 
efficiency of the established framework. According to Ravarijaona (2017), 81% of maritime 
professionals understand corruption to be “abusive power to obtain personal gain”. 
Shipowners are generally unwilling to report instances of corruption for fear of retribution, 
either immediately whilst lengthy investigations are carried out, through additional barriers 
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placed in the way when the vessel returns to the port or by other vessels receiving preferential 
treatment. Often the ship operator suffers an additional loss as a result. Whilst there are appeal 
processes in place for owners and operators to appeal the outcome of PSC inspections, such 
an approach citing corruption as the root cause is difficult to substantiate. It is simply easier to 
pay the inducement and get on with business than to challenge the system particularly in 
places where corruption extends upwards through government. IMO has established The 
Code of Good Conduct as part of Port State Control Procedures (IMO, 2019b) but 
enforcement is left to Member States. The Global Integrated Ship Information System 
(GISSI) of IMO has a mechanism that provides for the reporting of corruption, but the report 
can only be made by flag State administrations and not directly by the public. 
This manuscript takes a wider approach and measures the effect of corruption on safety 
qualities at the vessel level using quantitative methods. Using a unique and comprehensive 
combination of data, the effect is measured towards an increase or decrease of the probability 
of detention or incident at the ship level taking a three-step approach. Both end points are 
considered since they are found to be separate risk dimensions relevant to identify risky 
vessels (Knapp and Heij, 2020, Heij and Knapp, 2019). Besides the effect of corruption on 
detention, high corruption can also facilitate weak implementation or enforcement of 
international conventions and can create loopholes for substandard shipping. 
Corruption is expressed by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International. The CPI score is an index that combines 13 different sources and is based on a 
combination of surveys to determine how experts and business executives perceive a 
country’s public sector to be corrupt. As by Transparency International (2018), it covers 
different corrupt behaviours in the public sector such as bribery, diversion of public funds, use 
of public funds for private gain, nepotism in the civil service and state capture in addition to 
some mechanism available to prevent corruption. It is widely used and has been assessed by 
the European Commission’s Competence Centre on Composite Indicator and by the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC, 2018) to ensure transparency of the methodology used and to ensure 
reliability of the scores. JRC (2018) concludes that the CPI provides a more accurate 
measurement than each of the individual sources separately (JRC, 2018).  
Since corruption has several dimensions, the approach used here covers the effect at the level 
of port state towards detention and at the level of flag state, beneficial owner and safety 
management company towards incident risk. In order to account for other effects that 
influence safety quality of vessels to predict detention or incident risk such as age, size, ship 
type, class society, flag, beneficial owner and Document of Compliance (DoC) company as 
well as the previous inspection and incident history and the correlation with economic factors 
(Knapp and Heij 2020, Heij and Knapp 2018, 2011, Knapp et al 2011, Podobnik et al 2008, 
Shao et al, 2007), a multi-step approach is used to ensure that the effect is filtered out and can 
be interpreted and visualized. The set of hypotheses to test are as follows: 
H1: An increase in the CPI is associated with a negative correlation for the probability of 
detention as briberies are paid off to ensure that a vessel is not detained. 
H2: An increase in the CPI is associated with a positive correlation for the probability of 
incident since it can influence profitability of vessels and decrease safety qualities of vessels 
as ship owners need to treat corruption costs as operational costs.  
H3: A positive correlation for the probability of incident can also support the hypothesis that 
vessels that are either registered in or managed or owned by countries with higher perceived 
corruption have lower safety qualities as enforcement mechanisms of international 




2. Methodology and data used 
The time frame used for the creation of the datasets used for the analysis was 2014 to 2019 
and Table 1 provides an overview of data sources used. Three dependent variables are chosen 
as follows: 1) detention, 2) TLVS (total loss and very serious) and 3) TLVSS. (total loss, very 
serious and serious combined) resulting in two main matrixes as follows: 1) matrix for 
detention models: 421,518 observations (12,543 detentions) and 2) matrix for incident 
models: 721,767 observations (11,896 TLVSS incidents). 
Global incident information is combined from at least four different sources and duplicates 
are eliminated. The remaining incidents are reclassified according to IMO definitions for 
seriousness which are very serious (including total loss), serious and less serious (IMO 2000). 
For the analysis presented here, only total loss, very serious (TLVS) and serious (S) ones are 
considered because less serious (LS) incidents are characterized by underreporting. Less 
serious incidents are only included as factor accounting for the incident history of a vessel but 
not as dependent variable. 
Table 1: Data sources used for the period 2014 to 2019 
Type of data Data sources 
Ship particulars (global fleet above 100gt) – all 
ship types 
IHS Maritime 
Global PSC data (all MoU’s) IHS Maritime 
Global Incident data IHS Maritime, LLIS, IMO, USCG 
Corruption Perception Index Transparency International 
Country income classifications World Bank 
Earnings Ship Intelligence Network (Clarkson) 
The selection for global inspection data is based on findings in the literature (Knapp 2006, 
Knapp and Franses 2007) who conclude that the effects of ship parameters (eg. age, ship type, 
flag, class etc.) towards the probability of detention do not vary significantly across the PSC 
regimes evaluated and that on average, inspections decrease incident risk. It was therefore 
concluded that data can be combined for statistical analysis. For all global inspection data, 
only initial inspections are considered and follow up inspections were excluded to reduce a 
possible source of bias. The selection of variables is based on Knapp (2006), Knapp and 
Franses (2007), Bijwaard et al (2009), Knapp and Heij (2020). To account for other effects 
that influence safety qualities of vessels including economic factors, we include these risk 
factors into the regressions when relevant as follows: 
• Basic ship particulars such as age, size of vessel, ship type, classification society, 
beneficial ownership, DoC company, flag at the time of the event of interest 
• Flag changes, ownership changes, DoC company changes and class changes (within 3 
years prior to the event date of interest) 
• Country of build grouped into four groups and interaction effects with three age groups 
• Main engine designer (individual company) and Main engine builder (individual country 
of location) if the model is large enough 
• The ‘presence of maritime expertise’ expressed as concentration of ownership companies, 
DoC companies, main engine builders, main engine designers in a particular country 
• Years of existence of beneficial ownership and DoC company  
• Lagged inspection and incident history of the ship within 30 to 360 days prior to the event 
of interest 
• Economic indicator to account for the effect of economic cycles on risk 
• Port States for the detention model to account for the differences in port state control 
inspection qualities at port state level 
5 
 
The main variable of interest is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International. For this analysis, the CPI scores are merged by respective year and country for 
port state to inspection data and the flag, owner and Document of Compliance Company 
(DoC) location to world fleet and incident data. The CPI index was inverted to make 
interpretation more intuitive, hence 0 means no corruption and 100 means highly corrupt (see 
Figure 1 for the year 2019). A positive effect therefore means an increasing effect towards the 
probability of detention (or incident) given an increase in the CPI. For more information 
about the scores, please refer to JRC (2018). Not all countries are evaluated by the CPI, hence 
the number of observations is adjusted for each regression. For international registries, the 
corruption index of the main country was used.  














Mean       56.88333
Median   62.00000
Maximum  90.00000
Minimum  12.00000
Std. Dev.   19.14201
Skewness  -0.608473




Note: inverted CPI (0 = no corruption, 100 = high corruption) 
All vessels above 100 GRT are included in the analysis and all ship types are considered as 
follows: 1) general cargo, 2) dry bulk, 3) container, 4) tanker, 5) passenger vessels, 6) other 
ship types, 7) fishing vessels, 8) tugs, 9) pleasure craft (large yachts with IMO number). For 
the detention models, the main ship types are 1 to 6 as very few inspections are carried out on 
fishing vessels, tugs and commercial super yachts. Overall, three dependent variables are used 
with the main parameters of interest as follows: 
− Detention: Port State where vessel was inspected and corresponding CPI values 
− Incidents (TLVSS, TLVS) – Flag States, county of location of Beneficial Owner and DoC 
company of vessels at time of incident and corresponding CPI values 
The number of all variables that can affect safety qualities of vessels as listed earlier can be 
large and a full regression model can contain as many as 600 variables to be tested. Individual 
coefficients in models with many factors are always hard to interpret as they measure partial 
effects. By including some covariates that are correlated with the variable of interest such as 
CPI, parts of the CPI effects can be absorbed into these variables and can also change signs 
and significance of signs of the coefficients of the parameters of interest. In order to test the 
hypotheses listed earlier, to enhance the interpretation of the parameters of interest and to be 
able to visualize the effects of interest, a multi-stage approach is used consisting of three main 
steps. 
Step 1: Estimation of full model without CPI values 
In step 1, a full binary logistic regression model is estimated to account for all possible factors 
that can influence the probability of detention or the probability of incident (TLVSS, TLVS). 
This model does not include any parameters for CPI values as they might be correlated with 
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other factors of interest. The main parameters of interest in this round are the coefficients for 
port states for detention and the coefficients for flag, beneficial owner and DoC company for 
incidents which forms the basis for step 2. The base model to model the probability of 
detention or incident is binary logistic regression. Let xi contain the explanatory factors listed 
in the previous section (e.g age, size, ship type, flag, classification society), then the logit 
model postulates that P (yi = 1|xi) = F (xiβ), where the weights β consist of a vector of 
unknown parameters and F is a cumulative distribution function (CDF). A popular choice is 
the CDF of the logistic distribution, which gives the well-known logit model. This model 
states that P (yi = 1|xi) = exp(xiβ)/(1+exp(xiβ) where xiβ is a weighted average of all 
explanatory factors and changes plus the intercept. The probabilities are estimated at the 
individual ship level (i) using Eviews. For further details on logit models, refer to Heij et al. 
(2004) or Verbeek (2008). To estimate the coefficients, quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) is 
used (Greene, 2000) as method of estimation in order to give some allowance for a possible 
misspecification of the assumed underlying distribution function. 
Step 2: Correlation of step 1 outcome with CPI values 
In this step, the coefficients from the binary logistic regression outputs from step 1 are 
correlated with the inverted CPI values (0=low to 100=high) for the port states for detention 
and for the country of location (beneficial owner, safety management company) or flag for 
incident (TLVSS, TLVS). The correlation provides the direction (positive or negative), 
strength and its significance. 
Step 3: Estimation of reduced model to obtain coefficient for CPI for visualization 
In this step, a reduced logit model is estimated still containing all important factors that 
influence safety qualities of vessels plus one parameter for CPI to measure the effect towards 
the probability. In this step, parameters that are highly correlated with the CPI values are 
excluded such as for instance port state factor for detention, flag, ownership, or DoC company 
for the various incident type models. The sign and significance of the coefficient for the CPI 
parameter is compared with the outcome for step 2 to see whether there is any change in the 
sign or its significance and to confirm whether the coefficients can be used for visualization 
of the partial effect of interest. 
3. Results and visualization of partial effects of interest 
Due the large amount of regression outputs and variables, only the most relevant results of the 
second stage are presented here. Appendix A and B provides basic model statistics of the logit 
models for step 1 and 3. For further details on logit model statistics such as the Mc Fadden R-
squared, the Schwarz Criteria and hit rate, please refer to Heij et al. (2004). 
Table 2 provides the main results of interest from step 2 – that is the correlation coefficients 
from the parameters of interest from step 1 with the CPI values for the respective parameters 
of interest for each model. Figure 2 provides the scatter plots (and fitted regression line) of the 
correlations that are significant in Table 2.  
One can see that H1 of CPI values for port states towards detention is confirmed with a 
negative correlation coefficient. Port States with high perceived corruption are less likely to 
detain which could be due to briberies and detention avoidance. The results for incident 
(TLVSS) do not confirm H2 or H3 albeit a positive correlation for beneficial owner and DoC 
company is found but not significant. For flag, the correlation is negative and significant 
implying that overall, vessels registered in countries with higher CPI values are less likely to 
have incidents. This could reflect the degree of underreporting of serious incidents compared 
to total loss and very serious (TLVS) incidents where correlation is positive. With respect to 
interpretation, the results are more valid for TLVS compared to TLVSS. 
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Table 2: Correlation results step 2 
Parameter of interest to test correlation DV Nr var Correlation Prob   
CPI port states with port states (step 1) detention 74 -0.27780 0.01660 ** 
CPI beneficial owner with owner location (step 1) TLVSS 61 0.10462 0.42230 ns 
  TLVS 60 0.29514 0.02210 ** 
CPI DoC company with DoC location (step1) TLVSS 53 0.06056 0.66660 ns 
  TLVS 51 0.09780 0.49480 ns 
CPI flag states with flags (step 1) TLVSS 131 -0.25182 0.00370 * 
  TLVS 60 0.39548 0.00090 * 
Note: * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, - ns = not significant, DV =- dependent variable 
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2c: Incident (TLVS) - Flag     2d: Incident (TLVS) – Ownership 
For incidents (TLVS), the results also confirm H2 and H3 for flag states and beneficial 
owners but not for DoC companies where correlation is positive but not significant. This also 
be that DoC companies have a higher degree of missing information as the link of vessel to 
company is not well defined in the IHSM data and 26% of the observations with incidents 
have missing data compared to 14% for owner or less than 15% for flag.  
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Vessels registered in a flag state with higher CPI values corruption are more likely to have 
incidents (TLVS) as the correlation is positive and significant. The same applies for vessels 
with owners located in a country with higher CPI values. This can confirm weaker 
enforcement and subsequently a higher degree of substandard shipping. It may also confirm 
that ship owners are subject to higher costs due to corruption which affects safety qualities 
negatively. 
The last section takes those four combinations and applies step 3 but running a reduced logit 
model to obtain the coefficient for CPI by entering CPI directly into the logit and excluding 
the parameters such as port states (detention) and flags and beneficial owner location (TLVSS 
and TLVS). The results are presented in Table 3. The step 3 models are estimated based on 
the main ship types excluding fishing vessels, tugs and pleasure craft. CPI values do not exist 
for all countries so the number of variables in the models are reduced respectively and are 
given in Table 3.  
Table 3: Coefficients of interest for visualization (logit model step 3) 
Parameter of interest for visualization DV Nr var Coefficient Prob   
CPI port state detention 199 -0.00956 0.00000 * 
CPI beneficial owner TLVS 108 -0.00016 0.94390 ns 
CPI flag TLVSS 134 -0.00955 0.00000 * 
  TLVS 69 -0.00043 0.83020 ns 
Note: * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, - ns = not significant, DV =- dependent variable 
The results confirm the negative relationship of CPI for port states towards the probability of 
detention and a negative relationship of CPI for flag states towards the probability of incident 
(TLVSS). The relationship could not be confirmed for flag or beneficial ownership location 
for the probability of incident (TLVS) which is most likely due to confounding and also 
confirms that a multi-step approach is needed to test for the underlying relationship. As a 
result, only significant coefficients from Table 3 are visualized in Figures 3 and 4. For the 
effects that could not be obtained from the logit model, the direction of the correlation can be 
seen from the scatter plots in Figure 2. The increase in the CPI values is shown on the x-axis 
and the estimated probabilities are plotted on the y-axis respectively. 




To create Figures 3 and 4, a typical vessel is chosen, and the base probability is estimated 
given the various input parameters. Assuming no corruption, this forms the base probability. 
Keeping all other variables fixed and only changing CPI from 0 to 40 and coefficients from 
Table 3, the respective probabilities are estimated and visualized in the graphs. The basic ship 
specific input parameters for the two Figures are as follows: 
• dry bulk carrier of 5 years and 38,927 GRT 
• the vessel is registered in Liberia with classification society Lloyds Register 
• the vessel changed flag and class once within the last 3 years 
• the vessel was built in China with main engine builder from Italy and main engine 
designer (Cummins) 
• the vessel is managed by a DoC company located in a middle-income country and is 
owned an owner located in a low-income country 
• average monthly earnings over the last 6 months prior to the event of interest are as by 
the SIN of Clarkson for dry bulk carriers 
• the vessel had one less serious incident in the last 365 days and 2 deficiencies were found 
during PSC inspections over the last 365 days 
Figure 4: Effect of CPI flag towards probability of incident (TLVSS) 
 
4. Discussions and policy implications 
While corruption is known to exist in the maritime industry and has been brought to the 
attention at IMO via the FAL Committee, the effect has not been quantified or visualized in 
the manner this analysis has and draws further attention to possible policy implications. 
Furthermore, sustainable development goal 16 (SDG) specifically relates to the fight against 
corruption (Hutter, 2018), in particular SDG 16.5 (reduce corruption and bribery in all their 
forms), SDG 16.6 (develop effective, accountable, and transparent institutions at all levels, 
SDG 16.10 (ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in 
accordance with national legislation and international agreements). Given the results 
presented here, some policy implications and challenges are discussed in this section based on 
the three key findings: 
− Finding 1 related to H1: Port states with higher perceived corruption are less likely to 
detain vessels as ship owners try to avoid detention, pay off briberies and treat those as 
part of operating costs. 
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− Finding 2 related to H2 and H3: Flag states or ship owners located in countries 
associated with higher perceived corruption are more likely to have incidents (TLVS) as 
the operating environment might facilitate substandard shipping and weaker enforcement 
of international conventions. Corruption also influences ship owners operating costs and 
can enhance economic hardship that influences reduced safety qualities of vessels as 
investigated and confirmed by Bijwaard et al (2009). 
− Finding 3: The results also highlight a degree of underreporting of serious incidents of 
flag states with higher perceived corruption. 
Accountability frameworks are not well established and harmonized across UN Organizations 
(JIU, 2011) which was also recognized by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution 
64/259). Based on a comparative analysis by the JIU (JIU,2011), a recommendation was 
made to IMO to develop a stand-alone accountability framework which relates to both 
Member States and Secretariat (JIU, 2011) as part of the political covenant of the 
Organization. The accountability framework should refer to 17 benchmarks and 43 tools 
including provisions for anti-corruption and anti-fraud. Latest development at IMO via the 
FAL Committee however highlight the importance to address corruption and the need to 
develop guidance to enforce anti-corruption practices. 
In the absence of IMO’s own accountability framework, the relevant recommended 
benchmarks of the JIU related to corruption could be integrated into IMO’s IMSAS 
(Mandatory Member States Audit Scheme at IMO). IMSAS is based on mandatory provisions 
in particular the provisions of the III Code (IMO, 2015). The consolidated IMSAS report on 
findings does not go into detail with respect to the areas of root causes that contribute to the 
lack of effective implementation of requirements (IMO, 2018).  
It is worth noting that existing policy processes within the PSC MoU’s were not established to 
tackle or account for the impact of corruption in the PSC space or flag state implementation in 
general. IMO in its remit can provide guidance to Member States on PSC procedures as is 
done with the implementation of the Code of good conduct (IMO, 2019b) as part of existing 
training. The Code encompasses three fundamental principles against which all actions of port 
state control officers are judged: integrity, professionalism and transparency and specifically 
refers to the freedom from corruption influences or motives, openness, and accountability. 
While the development of a new targeting factor is outside the scope of this analysis (see 
Knapp and Heij, 2020 for improved targeting using statistical models), CPI values could be 
included into targeting routines for detention, but it is not recommended to do so. The effect 
can easily be confounded with other factors. Only one maritime administration (Australia) so 
far uses statistical models to target vessels for port state control inspection. It would be 
challenging to convince PSC MoU’s to agree on using quantitative methods to improve their 
targeting besides including a factor that accounts for CPI given the political sensitivities 
associated with allegations of corruption and the slowness of the process of updating targeting 
routines in general. A better approach would be to try to enforce the Good code of conduct by 
enhanced training and to include measures within IMSAS as well as work via the FAL 
Committee to establish a GISIS module that enables transparent reporting of corruption. 
Perhaps an improvement in transparency of PSC inspection data might assist with the 
detection of corruption and provide better means to provide the necessary proof for ship 
owners. GISIS does not allow reporting by members of the public. The channel currently is 
from the owner company to the flag State and activation of appeal procedure within the PSC 
regime. It may be that company report directly to the PSC regimes but that does not happen 
often. GISIS could be amended to include a reporting capability that allows ship owners or 
companies to report directly to IMO and the flag state either via a standalone module on 
corruption or via the already existing module for Port State Control. The improvement of 
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GISIS would also assist IMSAS auditors to prepare for an audit as well as increasing 
transparency in line with SDG 16. 
Concerning finding 3 related to the possible degree of underreporting by flag states, the 
relevant policy implication would be to make the reporting of serious incidents to GISIS 
mandatory. Currently, only the reporting of very serious incidents is mandatory (IMO, 2014) 
by electronic means to GISIS. Increased reporting will also help with pre-emptive risk 
management and could also include less serious incidents. 
5. Conclusions and future research 
This manuscript investigates the relationship of the CPI index towards the probability of 
detention and incident (TLVSS and TLVS) from several dimensions. A multi-step approach is 
used in order to enhance interpretation of the effect of interest that can otherwise become 
confounded with the effect of other factors that influence safety qualities of a vessel. The 
findings confirm the hypotheses and demonstrate that the effect of corruption is present. 
Since corruption can potentially increase incident risk and create burden to ship owners and 
operators who integrate the cost of corruption into their operating costs, the findings should 
not be ignored by policy makers and the findings support industry efforts and efforts at IMO 
to establish accountability frameworks and enhance transparency in line with SDG 16. 
Relevant policy implications could be to strengthen the fight against corruption via IMSAS or 
the FAL Committee in general and specifically by strengthening training and enforcement of 
the Code of Good Conduct for Port State Control Inspectors. To enhance transparency, GISIS 
could be adjusted to include an option to report corruption directly by ship owners and 
operators to IMO and flag states. In order to decrease underreporting of incidents, mandatory 
reporting of serious incidents should be included into GISIS. 
Future research in this area would be to quantify the effect of corruption in monetary terms – 
that is to translate the effect towards the probability of detention or incident into potential 
incident costs due to the effect on corruption. This will provide policy makers with an 
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Appendix A: Model statistics binary logistics regression (step 1) 
Model         Nr McFad Schwarz HR% 
Parameter of interest DV Total DV Rate var R-sqrd criteria overall 
Port states detention 421,518 12,543 0.0298 275 0.1801 0.2280 74.90 
Beneficial owner locations TLVSS 721,767 11,896 0.0165 349 0.1581 0.1480 72.05 
  TLVS 721,767 1,736 0.0024 196 0.0838 0.0315 71.22 
DoC Company locations TLVSS 721,767 11,896 0.0165 336 0.1511 0.1436 71.65 
  TLVS 721,767 1,738 0.0024 299 0.0998 0.0313 71.54 
Flag TLVSS 721,767 11,896 0.0165 289 0.1539 0.1476 72.26 
  TLVS 721,767 1,738 0.0024 150 0.0864 0.0337 71.78 
Note: DV = dependent variable, Nr var = Number of variables in model, HR = overall hit rates 
 
Appendix B: Model statistics binary logistics regression (step 3) 
Model         Nr McFad Schwarz HR% 
Parameter of interest DV Total DV Rate var R-sqrd criteria overall 
CPI port States detention 420,985 12,530 0.0298 199 0.1217 0.2414 74.91 
CPI beneficial owner locations TLVS 354,679 924 0.0026 108 0.0801 0.0372 71.55 
CPI flag TLVSS 398,113 7,505 0.0189 134 0.1337 0.1664 73.81 
  TLVS 398,113 1,092 0.0027 69 0.0693 0.0375 68.92 
Note: DV = dependent variable, Nr var = Number of variables in model, HR = overall hit rates 
 
